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COMMENTS
CONFLICTS OF LAW-EXTENDED APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA
IN AnMINSTRATION OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES-Too often traditional
rules of law are blindly followed without adequate re-evaluation
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of their usefulness in terms of new trends and policies. One such
neglected rule is the traditional refusal to apply res judicata principles in actions involving administrators or executors in different
states where a decedent's estate is sued by a creditor of the decedent,
or where the estate is suing a debtor of the decedent. This problem
arises from the fact that the fundamental structure of administration of decedents' estates in the United States is founded on the
principle of a separate administration within each jurisdiction
where assets of the decedent are located. As a result there is often
an excessive duplication of litigation which over-burdens our
already crowded court dockets. Possibly this condition could be
alleviated by more extensive application of the doctrine of res
judicata in these cases. The purpose of this comment is to examine
the existing law and its rationale, and to see in which situations
res judicata could beneficially be applied.

I. Existing Law and Rationale When Creditor Attempts To Bind
Local Estate With Foreign Judgment
For over a century it has been a generally recognized rule of
law that judgments against a decedent's administrator in state A
are not conclusive or binding on decedent's administrator or executor in state B.1 The leading case of Stacy v. Thrasher2 held that
a creditor's judgment against an ancillary administrator was not
conclusive in a second suit by the creditor against the domiciliary
administrator. The same result is reached if the domiciliary administrator is sued first. 3 Even if the same party is defending
administrator in both jurisdictions, res judicata would not be
applied.4 However, a distinction is made in the case of executors.
If the same party is executor in both jurisdictions, a judgment in
state A is binding on him in state B.5 But if there are two different
executors, a judgment in the first suit may be used only as evidence
in the second. 6 While decisions go both ways7 in the hybrid situation of an executor and an administrator cum testamento annexo,
1 CoNFLICTS REsrATEMENT §§506 (1), 510 (1) (1934); STUMBERG, CONFLICTS OF LAW 443446 (1951); GOODRICH, CONFLICTS OF LAW, 3d ed., §191 (1949).
2 6 How. (47 U.S.) 44 (1848).
3 McCleen v. Meek, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 16 (1855).
4 Nash v. Benari, 117 Me. 491, 105 A. 107 (1918); Johnston v. McKinnon, 129 Ala.
223, 29 S. 696 (1901). Contra, Creighton v. Murphy, 8 Neb. 349, 1 N.W. 138 (1879).
5 Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1891); Owsley v. Central Trust Co. of N.Y., (S.D.
N.Y. 1912) 196 F. 412.
6 Hill v. Tucker, 13 How. (54 U.S.) 458 (1851). The court permitted the judgment
to be used as evidence in order to preclude the ancillary executor from pleading the
statute of limitations as a defense.
7 Judgment conclusive: Garland v. Garland, 84 Va. 181, 4 S.E. 334 (1887); Latine v.
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the majority have denied both res judicata and evidentiary effect.
Furthermore, it makes no difference that the action was commenced against the decedent during his lifetime and later revived
against his representative.8 The above rules were developed where
the issue most frequently arises, that is, where a creditor attempts
to use a judgment obtained against the estate in state A to bind
the representative in state B, and an analysis of the rationale of
the law as it applies to this one situation should precede a discussion
of the applicability of the same principles to other situations in
multi-state administration.
A. In Rem or In Personam? The separate administration of
decedents' estates is justified by the power of each sovereign state
to regulate the manner and circumstances under which property
within its territory shall be transferred.0 This necessitates the
appointment of an administrator in each jurisdiction where assets
are found, since the authority and power of an administrator or
executor under his letters testamentary extend only to the territory
of the issuing state.10 Because of this territorial limitation on
authority, the administration is sometimes considered a proceeding
in rem11 or quasi-in-rem12 as to the assets in the jurisdiction. Thus
any adjudication on the assets within one jurisdiction would not
be conclusive on assets within another. However, if the proceeding
is considered as an in personam action against the representative
of the estate, whether or not the representative in the second suit
is a party or privy to the first suit becomes the controlling issue.
B. Privity. Probably the reason most often given for denying
res judicata between administrators is that no privity exists between administrators and executors authorized under laws of differClements, 3 Kelly (Ga.) 426 (1847). Judgment not conclusive: Ela v. Edwards, 13 Allen
(95 Mass.) 48 (1866); Richards v. Blaisdell, 12 Cal. App. 101, 106 P. 732 (1909).
s Brown v. Fletcher's Estate, 146 Mich. 401, 109 N.W. 686 (1906). Contra, Creighton v.
Murphy, 8 Neb. 349, 1 N.W. 138 (1879).
o See 1 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §157 (1923). Divided administrations are also justified on the basis that it permits local creditors to be satisfied
first out of local assets, enabling them to avoid the inconvenience of filing claiins outstate.
See Buchanan and Myers, "The Administration of Intangibles in View of First National
Bank v. Maine," 48 HARV. L. REv. 911 (1935), wherein the authors also trace the historical
development of the administration of decedents' estates.
10 See 1 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §158 (1923).
11 See Simes, "The Administration of Decedent Estates as Proceeding in Rem," 43
MICH. L. REv. 675 (1944). For administration on an entity theory, see Bayse, "Dispensing
With Administration,'' 44 MICH. L. REv. 329 (1945). See also STUMBERC, CONFLICTS OF
LAw, 2d ed., 439, n. 6 (1951). Cf. Baker, "In the Administration of Intangibles: Missouri's
Section 466.010 in Perspective," 19 Mo. L. REv. 1 at 13-19, 36-42 (1954).
12 Johnson v. Powers, 139 U.S. 156 (1891). See 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws 1552
(1935).
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ent jurisdictions.13 The requirement of privity arises from the
general rule that a judgment in personam is only binding on parties
or privies.14 It is well recognized that administrators and executors
are each in privity with the decedent and that a judgment against
the decedent during his lifetime is binding on his representatives.11s
Consequently, it has been contended that since the representatives
are all in privity with the decedent, the source of their interests,
they should also be in privity with each other.16 This conclusion
is fallacious, however, if one adopts the classical definition of privity, viz., a "mutual or successive relationship to the same right of
property."17 It is clear that the representatives in different jurisdictions do not succeed to, nor have a mutual relation to, the same
property rights, but succeed only to. those assets within their respective jurisdictions.18 Furthermore, even an administrator appointed in both states A and B is not considered to have been
party to an adjudication in state A when he is being sued in state
B since he is sued in a different capacity in the second suit.19 In
any case, it is doubtful that the lack of technical privity is the true
reason for a denial of res judicata, since, as one court put it, a finding of privity is just a legal conclusion raised in order to justify
the binding effect of a judgment in a particular case.20 The real
basis for refusing to apply res judicata in these cases is the questionable but accepted policy of separate administrations and the courts'
interest in prevention of fraud.

a

C. Prevention of Fraud. The judges in the early opinions on
the question of res judicata between administrators realized that
the rules were based on mere technicalities causing much inconvenience,21 but sustained the results because they were afraid that
a judgment procured by fraud or collusion in state A would be
conclusively binding in state B. It was stated in the first leading
opinion, Brodie v. Bickley:~ 2
13 Stacy v. Thrasher, 6 How. (47 U.S.) 44 (1848). See Story, CONFLICT OF LAws, 8th
ed., §522 (1883).
14 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, 5th ed., §407 (1925).
15 Id., §492.
.
16 See La tine v. Clements, 3 Kelly (Ga.) 426 (1847). Contra, Low v. Bartlett, 8 Allen
(90 Mass.) 259 (1864).
171 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE, 15th ed., §523 (1892).
,
18 Wilson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., (8th Cir. 1908) 164 F. 817.
19 See Nash v. Benari, 117 Me. 491, 105 A. 107 (1918).
20 Taylor v. Sartorious, 130 Mo. App. 23, 108 S.W. 1089 (1908). See Developments in
the Law of Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818 at 855 (1952).
21 Stacy v. Thrasher, 6 How. (47 U.S.) 44 (1848); Ingersoll v. Coram, 211 U.S. 335
(1908).
22 2 Rawle (Pa.) 431 (1830). The facts of this case gave adequate cause for the court's
fear of possible collusion, since the foreign .administrator in Barbados had confessed
judgment.
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"It is of little moment that such a [fraudulent] judgment
is not conclusive and that if there be fraud in fact, the administrator here may show it. It is sufficient that the doctrine [res
judicata] would shift the burden of proof in the first instance
and send the defendant [administrator] abroad under every
possible disadvantage, to investigate transactions, the secret
springs of which must necessarily be hidden from him." 23
This aversion to placing the burden of proof of fraud on the local
administrator was reiterated as a ba~is for the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Stacy v. Thrasher, where the Court felt the shift
"would cause much greater inconvenience and injury than any
that can possibly result from the present decision." 24
Exactly how much fraud or collusion would occur if foreign
judgments were binding is difficult to estimate. A real danger may
exist, however, if a creditor has an ancillary administrator appointed25 in state A in order that the creditor may file his claim
against the decedent's assets in that state. It is quite possible that
the administrator appointed will be friendly to the creditor, and,
because of collusion, the administrator may not properly contest
a disputable claim. If such a judgment26 were conclusive elsewhere, there would be a real danger of prejudice to other creditors
and devisees. Furthermore, it is possible the fraud involved may
be considered intrinsic fraud, and the judgment may not be subject
therefore to collateral attack.27 Under present law no distinction
is made as to whether the first suit arose in a domiciliary or ancillary admipistration. It might be argued that the judgment should
be binding if the suit arose in the domiciliary state, for usually a
relative is appointed there, and the likelihood of fraud would be
minimal since he would have the best interests of the estate in
mind. 28 If the same party is administrator in both states, the
questio1,1 of fraud will never even be raised.
23 Id.

at 437-438.
How. (47 U.S.) 44 at 61 (1848). For interesting variations in suits involving
decedent's fraudulent transfers see White v. Croker, (5th Cir. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 321; King
v. Clarke, 2 Hill Eq. (S.C.) 6ll (1836).
25 In some states the creditor himself can be appointed the administrator. See 2
WOERNER, AMERICAN I.Aw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §239 (1923).
20 Whether a claim allowed or disallowed by a probate court will be considered a
judgment for purposes of full faith and credit may depend on individual state procedure
and whether the claim was contested on the merits. See, e.g., Taylor v. Barron, 35 N.H.
484 (1857); Goodall v. Marshall, 14 N.H. 161 (1843).
27 See "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud and Relief Against Judgments," 4 VAND. L. REv.
338 (1951).
28 But see Strauss v. Philips, 189 Ill. 9, 59 N.E. 560 (1901), where decedent's wife, the
domiciliary administrator, did attempt to defraud the estate to the prejudice of other
creditors.
24 6
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Aside from the issue of fraud, would the application of res
judicata in any other way prejudice creditors? If the decedent's
estate is totally insolvent, the foreign judgment creditor would
receive only his proportionate share of the total estate, for the
estate would be treated as an entity in this situation.29 On the
other hand, if the estate on the whole is solvent, and the judgment
creditor is satisfied before local creditors,30 local creditors would
be prejudiced only to the extent that they had to file claims elsewhere to be fully satisfied.31
D. Distinction Between Administrators and Executors. That
there should be res judicata effect on judgments where the same
party is executor in both states32 while not where the same party3 8
is administrator has been criticized by most leading commentators.34 The differentiation first arose in Hill v. Tucker,35 where
the Supreme Court distinguished the executor from the administrator on the basis that executors derive their authority from the
will rather than from the state; and that as to creditors, executors
are all in privity since they owe the same responsibility to creditors
no matter where the assets exist36 or where the executor is qualified.
The Court's reasoning is no longer valid. Though the will may
direct the choice of who shall be the executor and possibly delimit
his powers, yet only by complying with conditions set forth in
state statutes is the executor able to effectuate the administration.87
Actually, both the executor and the administrator receive their
power and authority from the state. Furthermore, in Hill v.
Tucker, the court reasoned that because co-executors within the
29 Estate of Hanreddy, 176 Wis. 570, 186 N.W. 744 (1922); CoNFucrs REsTATEMENT
§§502, 503 (1934).
30 Judgment creditors of the estate have priority over general creditors. 2 WOERNER,
AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §376 (1923).
31 It is possible the local creditors may be prejudiced if they relied on being satisfied
out of local assets and did not file claims elsewhere until after they discovered the foreign
judgments would consume the entire local estate. By that time the statute of limitations
may have expired in other jurisdictions.
82 Note 5 supra.
83 Note 4 supra.
84 GOODRICH, CoNFLicr OF LAws, 3d ed., 571 (1949); 3 BEALE, CoNFLicr OF LAws
1550 (1935).
35 Note 6 supra.
36 In Owsley v. Central Trust Co. of N.Y., (S.D. N.Y. 1912) 196 F. 412, the court
justified the distinction on the theory that the executor takes title to all of the testator's
personalty wherever situated so that voluntary payments made by nonresident debtors are
good acquittance and an assignment by him enables the assignee to sue anywhere. However, these rights usually vest in the domiciliary representative whether executor or
administrator. See GOODRICH, CONFLicr OF LAws, 3d ed., §§187, 188 (1949).
371 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §172 (1923).
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same jurisdiction are in privity with each other, executors qualifying in other jurisdictions must also be in privity. This conclusion
does not necessarily follow if one adopts the traditional view of
privity.38
In the leading case on same-party executors, Carpenter v.
Strange,3° the Supreme Court did not attempt to distinguish executors from administrators, but stated simply that the prior judgment
was conclusive because it was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon the same subject matter, between the same parties, 40 for the same purpose. The question of fraud was not even
raised since the fraud problem is not applicable in this situation.41
It is submitted that the straightforward approach of the court in
the Carpenter case was appropriate to the case and that the same
results should be reached in same-party administrator litigation.
Thus if the judgment obtained in the foreign jurisdiction is defended on the merits by the same party who is administrator in
the second suit, the judgment should be given full faith and credit.
Because the possibility of fraud or collusion still prevails, however,
if the judgment is rendered against a different administrator, there
should be no res judicata.

II. Application of the Law to Other Situations
Often a broad rule of law, though properly suited to the specific
situation under which it developed, may not be applicable to other
similar situations where it would seem to be applicable. The purpose of the second half of this comment is to test the rules discussed
in part I as they apply to three other situations, and to determine
if the application of res judicata would be justified. It should be
kept in mind that the policy of res judicata is to end needless litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on a question of fact from retrying that question. 42 Furthermore, it should
be remembered that the administrators do possess a close identity
of interest43 in that they are all representing the same decedent's
estate.44
88 See note 17 supra and adjacent text.
89 141 U.S. 87 (1891).
40 It seems the court ignored the different

representative capacities of the executor
and realistically recognized the identity of the interest represented. But see note 19 supra
and adjacent text.
41 It would be a highly unusual case where an administrator who had practiced
collusive fraud in the first suit would raise his fraud in the second action.
42 Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
43 See Lomas v. Hilliard, 60 N.H. 148 (1880).
44 For the remainder of the comment no distinction between administrators and
executors will be drawn.
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A. Judgment for the Estate in Credito't's Suit Against the
Foreign Administrator. Where a creditor has fully litigated his
claim in state A and loses, both the Restatement45 and one Supreme
Court case46 hold that a second suit in state B is not barred. However, the other few cases directly on point have barred a second
suit. In Lomas v. H illiard,41 after a full hearing on the merits of
the creditor's claim and a disallowance by the Vermont probate
court, a second suit was not permitted in New Hampshire. The
court stated that where the same party is administrator in both
states,
" ... he exercises his own judgment in both states in behalf
of the same estate and to say that an adjudication of a matter
concerning the estate in one state, to which he was a proper
party, would not be binding on the parties in another state,
because he happened to derive his representative character
in both states from different sources, is, it seems to us, a technical refinement not often found in modern legal reasoning.
It is not suggested that the assets of the estate would be any
differently affected in one jurisdiction than in the other,
although the proceedings in each state are had primarily with
reference to the assets in that state; nor is it apparent how the
same administrator could do any more or less in his defense
against the claim in this suit in one state than in the other."48
Although admittedly the court ·was influenced by the fact that the
same party was administrator in both states, the basic logic of this
holding applies equally well to different party administrators when
asserting bar.49 Of course, there is :i:io mutuality here, for if the
creditor had won there would be no res judicata effect. But mutuality is essentially an equitable doctrine requiring fairness and is not
truly applicable here. The primary reason that the creditor does
not have the benefit of res judicata is to prevent fraud, but the
possibility of enforcing a fraudulently obtained judgment against
the estate is not present when the estate wins the first suit. One
might analogize this to defensive collateral estoppel where the
§511 (1934).
In Aspden v. Nixon, 4 How. (45 U.S.) 466 (1846), it was a contesting heir rather
than a creditor who after losing in England was allowed to sue again in the United
States. Thus no question of full faith and credit was involved.
47 60 N.H. 148 (1880).
48 Id. at 150.
49 Goodall v. Marshall, 14 N.H. 161 (1843). Cf. Sanborn v. Perry, 86 Wis. 361, 56
N.W. 337 (1893), where there was no trial on the merits, but the statute of limitations
defeated the first suit.
45 CONFLICTS REs'I'ATEMENT

.

46
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usual need for mutuality is often disregarded.50 A recent analogous case of defensive collateral estoppel is Riordan v. Ferguson. 51
In a prior action between the mortgagee and a grantee of several
parcels of land from the mortgagor's larger tract, it was determined
that the mortgage debt had been satisfied. Res judicata as a defense
was successfully pleaded in a later foreclosure action by the mortgagee against another grantee of other parcels from the same mortgagor's tract. Though the grantees were not in privity with each
other, they derived their interests from the same source as to possible defenses, and since a full adjudication was had on the merits,
a second action was not allowed.
The limited authority on point indicates that res judicata is
presently being applied by some courts when a creditor upon losing
the first suit attempts to sue another administrator in another
jurisdiction. However, it may be noted that this result is limited
to cases where the issue was litigated on the merits, and is not
reached where, for example, the claim was disallowed because the
statute o~ limitations had run in the first jurisdiction.52

Judgment for Foreign Administrator in His Suit Against
Debtor. It is a generally accepted rule that once an administrator
has procured a judgment against a debtor of the decedent, the
cause of action is merged and no other administrator can sue, either
on the debt or on the judgment.53 Here the merger aspect of
res judicata is utilized, but other administrators can not sue on the
judgment. As usual, the reason given is that there is no privity.
It could be argued that there is privity at least until a judgment
is granted. A cause of action is a property interest, and, since each
administrator mutually succeeds to the same transitory causes of
action, they are mutually interested in the same property right.
But it is said that once the judgment is rendered, the cause of action
is appropriated to that jurisdiction,54 so that the other administrators no longer have an interest. The merits of this last contention
need not be seriously attacked, for there seems to be no pressing
reason for permitting other administrators to sue on the judgment.
B.

50 Developments

in the Law of Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818 at 862 (1952).
(S.D. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 973.
52Wilson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., (8th Cir. 1908) 164 F. 817; 19 L.R.A. (n.s.) 553
(1909). See note, 41 IowA L. REv. 271 (1956). Contra, Sanborn v. Perry, 86 Wis. 361, 56
N.W. 337 (1893), and cases collected in 19 L.R.A. (n.s.) 553 (1909).
53 Talmage v. Chapel, 16 Mass. 71 (1819); Hare v. O'Brien, 233 Pa. 330, 82 A. 475
(1911); CONFLICIS REs1°ATEMENT §505 (1934).
54 See Coram v. Ingersoll, (1st Cir. 1906) 148 F. 169, revd. on other grounds 211 U.S.
335 (1908).
51
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Efficient collection of the judgment is possible at present because
the successful administrator can sue on the judgment in any state
where jurisdiction over the defendant can be attained.55 Also, the
debtor is not now subject to excessive attachments by several administrators, as might be the case if the rule were modified.

C. Judgment for Debtor in Foreign Administrator's Suit
Against the Debtor. There is a scarcity of cases in which the
question of res judicata has arisen where the administrator's suit
in state A against a debtor was defeated and a second suit undertaken in state B.56 In the one leading case, Ingersoll v. Coram,51
the Supreme Court, in reversing the First Circuit,58 held that the
ancillary administrator was not barred from a second suit after
judgment had gone against the domiciliary administrator. The
Court admitted that the privity rationale in Stacy v. Thrasher was
artificial and that it led to inconvenient and burdensome results
from repetitious litigation. Yet the court felt constrained to deny
the debtor relief because there was no mutuality in the sense that
the estate as a whole would not be bound if it had lost as defendant in a creditor's suit in one state. It is submitted that this is an
unwarranted extension of the normal mutuality rule. But even
if one should accept the Court's mutuality extension, it should
not be applied unless the same danger of fraud on the estate exists
as when the suing creditor wins. It is unlikely that when an administrator sues a debtor he will be practicing collusive fraud on
the estate at the instance of the debtor. For unless a large amount
is involved, the debtor will probably not wish to draw attention
to his debt or take the risks that would accompany such a fraudulent scheme. But if he should deliberately have a collusive ancillary administrator appointed, the domiciliary administrator would
know of large outstanding debts and would be likely to check
See note 53 supra.
See Aspden v. Nixon, 4 How. (45 U.S.) 466 (1846), where the administrator of a
contesting heir claiming decedent's estate was not barred from a second suit in the United
States after losing a similar contest in England.
57 211 U.S. 335 (1908).
68 Coram v. Ingersoll, (1st Cir. 1906) 148 F. 169, revd. on other grounds 211 U.S. 335
(1908). The Court barred a second action on a mutuality theory that if a judgment is
binding when a plaintiff administrator wins, it should be binding also when he loses.
Usually mutuality means that taking the same suit and parties, both parties should be
able to assert res judicata principles regardless if they win or lose. The Court in the
Ingersoll case has changed the format of the suit and has the debtor as plaintiff. But if
the usual mutuality rule should be applied, res judicata would be applicable since if the
same plaintiff administrator had won, defendant could have pleaded merger to another
administrator's suit.
55

56

1956]

COMMENTS

271

personally into the matter and defeat any such scheme.59 Furthermore, as to non-collusive fraud by the debtor alone, it must be
assumed that the supervisory court and the first administrator will
do their utmost to uncover any fraudulent design. In addition, if
bar could not be asserted, the result could create considerable
burdens on interstate corporations. If a decedent possessed a claim
against a multi-state corporation depending on a close fact question, the various administrators could sue the corporation in every
state in which it does business until the estate finally wins a favorable jury verdict or forces the debtor corporation to compromise
to prevent further nuisance suits. With the presently crowded
court dockets, there is no room for unnecessary nuisance suits or
relitigation of the same issue by parties who derive their cause of
action from the same source. A debtor of the estate who wins on
the merits in the first action should certainly be able to assert bar
to further litigation by other administrators on the same cause
of action.

Conclusion
Though the concept of separate administrations of decedents'
estates will be with us for some time, it may be possible to alleviate
some of its duplication of effort and excessive litigation through
extended application of the res judicata doctrine in appropriate
cases. Two trends in the law today lend support to such a result.
First, there is a more extensive use of res judicata generally in recent years. 60 Secondly, there are already several breakthroughs in
the walls supporting separate administrations. Executors and administrators under statutes in several states can sue61 and be sued62
outside their state of appointment. In the administration of small
estates it has been suggested that the domiciliary representative be
a universal administrator and completely eliminate the ancillary
representative. 63 In view of these recent trends, in appropriate
cases it is quite possible that the courts may adopt the contention
IS9 Since the domiciliary administrator is often one who will share in the estate, he
will no doubt make every effort possible to recover outstanding debts.
60 See Developments in the Law of Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818 at 861-865
(1952). For illustrations of the increased use of res judicata on jurisdictional questions,
see Rashid, "Full Faith and Credit Clause: Collateral Attack of Jurisdictional Issues,'' 36
GEo. L.J. 154 (1948); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
611 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., §163 (1923); Bayse, "Dispensing With Administration," 44 MICH. L. REv. 329 at 413 (1945).
62 Scott, "Hess and Pawloski Carry On,'' 64 HARv. L. REv. 98 (1950). Contra, CON·
FLICTS REsrATEMENT §512 (Supp. 1948).
63 Bayse, "Dispensing With Administration," 44 MICH. L. REv. 329 at 408 et seq. (1945).
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that it is time that res judicata be applied more generally in the
administration of decedents' estates. However, in those situations
where real possibilities of fraud still prevail, the courts will probably retain the existing law.
Norman-A. Zilber, S.Ed.

